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Abstract. In this paper we exploit the notions of conjoined and it-
erated conditionals, which are defined in the setting of coherence by
means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the inter-
val [0, 1]. We examine the iterated conditional (B|K)|(A|H), by showing
that A|H p-entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Then, we show
that a p-consistent family F = {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails a conditional
event E3|H3 if and only if E3|H3 = 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for some
nonempty subset S of F , where QC(S) is the quasi conjunction of the
conditional events in S . Then, we examine the inference rules And, Cut,
Cautious Monotonicity, and Or of System P and other well known in-
ference rules (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Bayes). We also show that
QC(F)|C(F) = 1, where C(F) is the conjunction of the conditional events
in F . We characterize p-entailment by showing that F p-entails E3|H3
if and only if (E3|H3)|C(F) = 1. Finally, we examine Denial of the an-
tecedent and Affirmation of the consequent, where the p-entailment of
(E3|H3) from F does not hold, by showing that (E3|H3)|C(F) 6= 1.
1 Introduction
The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by using prob-
ability theory instead of classical bivalent logic as a normative back-
ground theory (see, e.g., Gilio & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2007;
Over, 2009; Elqayam & Over, 2012; Pfeifer & Douven, 2014; Pfeifer, 2013;
Politzer & Baratgin, 2015). One of the key topics of the new paradigm psy-
chology of reasoning is how people interpret and reason about conditionals
(see, e.g., Douven, 2016; Edgington, 1995; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010;
Evans & Over, 2004; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005, 2010; Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017;
Oaksford & Chater, 2003; Over & Cruz, 2018). How people interpret and rea-
son about conditionals was also one of the key topics in the (old) logic-based
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paradigm psychology of reasoning, which dominated the 20th century experi-
mental psychology of reasoning. While human interpretation of conditionals was
labeled as “irrational” or “defective”, since the participants’ responses deviated
from the semantics of the material conditional, rationality was revisited and re-
habilitated within the new probabilistic paradigm: specifically, the majority of
participants
– treat negated antecedents as irrelevant for evaluating whether a conditional
holds, and
– evaluate their degrees of belief in conditionals by respective conditional prob-
abilities (and not by the probability of the material conditional).
These findings speak for the conditional event interpretation, and against the
material conditional interpretation, of conditionals.
Among various interpretations of probability, we advocate and use the
coherence-based approach to probability (see, e.g., Berti, Miranda, & Rigo,
2017; Biazzo & Gilio, 2000; Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz, & Sanfilippo,
2005; Capotorti, Lad, & Sanfilippo, 2007; Coletti & Scozzafava,
2002; Coletti, Petturiti, & Vantaggi, 2016; Gilio, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo,
2016; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013c, 2013d, 2014; Sanfilippo, 2012;
Walley, Pelessoni, & Vicig, 2004), which traces back to Bruno de Finetti
(1937/1980, 1970/1974). From a psychological point of view, it is evident that
probability serves to measure degrees of belief and not some objective quantity
in the world: this is in line with de Finetti provocative ontological motto
“Probability does not exist”(1970/1974, Preface). The probabilistic approach
based on coherence is thus characterized by subjective, and not by objective,
probabilities. Methodologically, the approach based on coherence principle
differs in many respects to standard approaches to probabilities. We mention
two of them which highlight the psychological plausibility of our approach.
First, contrary to many approaches to probability, the coherence-based ap-
proach does not require a complete algebra. For drawing a probabilistic modus
ponens inference, for example, an algebra could be constructed from the con-
stituents derived from the involved events in the inference rule. This is psycho-
logically plausible, as the reasoning person may focus on only what is considered
to be relevant for drawing the inference.
Second, conditional probability is a primitive notion and it is not defined by
the fraction of the joint and the marginal probabilities: the standard definition
of P (C|A) by P (A∧C)
P (A) requires to assume that P (A) > 0, as a fraction over zero
is undefined. Probabilistic approaches which define conditional probabilities in
this way can therefore not properly manage zero antecedent probabilities. The
subjective probabilistic approach allows for managing zero antecedent probabil-
ities; moreover, zero probabilities are even exploited for reducing the complexity
of the probabilistic inference. Another aspect of defining conditional probability
directly is that the degree of belief in a conditional If A, then C can be given in a
direct way by the reasoner without presupposing knowledge about P (A∧C) and
P (A): even as in everyday life it may be impracticable to evaluate the latter two
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probabilities, people do assess conditionals. For example, if we want to assess our
degree of belief in the conditional that If I take the train at six, I am at home
at seven, we can do that directly, without thinking first about the unconditional
probabilities of I take the train at six and I am at home at seven and of I take
the train at six.
In some recent papers of Gilio and Sanfilippo the notions of conjoined and
iterated conditionals have been introduced as suitable conditional random quan-
tities (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2017a). These new objects extend
the usual notions of conjunction and conditioning from the case of unconditional
events to the case of conditional events. For instance, we developed a semantics
for examples like the following (which was presented by Douven, 2016, p. 45):
(I) If the mother is angry if the son gets a B, then she will be furious if
the son gets a C,
which is an iterated (or nested) conditional. It consists of a conditional in its
antecedent
(A) if the son gets a B, then the mother is angry,
and a conditonal in its consequent
(C) if the son gets a C, then the mother is furious.
Of course, the degree of belief in (I) cannot be something like a condi-
tional probability, as the famous triviality results by Lewis (1976) have shown.
Rather, we conceive iterated conditonals like (I) as conditional random quan-
tities (and not as conditonal events) and measure the degree of belief in
such objects by previsions P (not by probabilities P ; Gilio & Sanfilippo,
2014; Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo, 2017; Sanfilippo, Pfeifer, Over, & Gilio,
2018). We will explain the formal details below. Interestingly, when we
considered the uncertainty propagation rule for the generalized proba-
bilistic modus ponens (Sanfilippo, Pfeifer, & Gilio, 2017), where the de-
gree of beliefs are propagated, for instance, from “The cup broke if dropped”
(A|H), and “if the cup broke if dropped, then the cup was fragile (C|(A|H))“ to
“the cup was fragile (C)”, we observed, that the uncertainty propagation rules
coincide with those of the non-iterated probabilistic modus ponens (i.e., from
P (A) = x and P (C|A) = y infer xy ≤ P (C) ≤ xy + 1 − x). Likewise, we have
shown that the uncertainty propagation rules of the iterated version of Cen-
tering coincide with the respective (non-iterated) probability propagation rules
(Sanfilippo et al., 2018). Thus, a remarkable aspect of the definitions of nested
conditionals in terms of conditonal random quantities preserve some well known
classical results.
The main result of this paper may be also related to an analogue result de-
rived from the deduction theorem. This theorem implies that if an argument is
logically valid (or if the premises logically entail the conclusion), then the argu-
ment can be transformed into a logically true conditional, s.t., the premises are
combined by conjunction and form the antecedent and the conclusion forms the
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consequent of the resulting condtional, which is then a tautology. For example,
the logically valid modus ponens (where A→ C denotes the material conditional
A ∨ C and |= denotes logical entailment),
{A,A→ C} |= C ,
can be transformed by the deduction theorem into the following conditional,
which is a tautology (and vice versa), that is:
(A ∧ (A→ C))→ C = (A ∧ (A ∨ C) ∨ C = Ω.
Instead of logical entailment, however, we consider in this paper the probabilis-
tic entailment (p-entailment), as introduced by Adams (1975, 1998). Let C(F)
denote the conjunction of the conditional events in a p-consistent family F . We
study, in analogy to the deduction theorem, whether the claim “a conditional
event E|H is p-entailed by a p-consistent family F of conditional events” is
equivalent to the claim “the prevision in the iterated conditional (E|H)|C(F)
is equal to 1”. We examine many cases related to this aspect; in particular, we
examine some inference rules of System P and other well known inference rules.
We remark that this basic relation, between p-entailment and iterated con-
ditioning, appears in its most elementary form when we consider two not im-
possible events A and B in the case where A ⊆ B, that is where A ∧ B = ∅.
In this case P (A) ≤ P (B) and then A p-entails B, that is P (A) = 1 implies
P (B) = 1, and the unique coherent assessment on B|A is P (B|A) = 1. There-
fore, by recalling that in the framework of the betting scheme, when we pay
P (B|A) = x, we receive B|A = AB+xA; when A ⊆ B, it holds that A p-entails
B and B|A = AB+1 ·A = A+A = 1. Conversely, if B|A = 1, then P (B|A) = 1;
moreover,
P (B) = P (B|A)P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) = P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) ,
and when P (A) = 1 it follows that P (B) = 1, so that A p-entails B.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries
on the notions of coherence and p-entailment for conditional random quantities,
which assume values in [0, 1]. In Section 3, after recalling the notions of conjoined
and iterated conditionals, we show that a conditional eventA|H p-entails another
conditional event B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Moreover, we show that
a p-consistent family of two conditional events {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails a condi-
tional event E3|H3 if and only if it holds that (E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1,
where QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) denotes the quasi conjunction of E1|H1, E2|H2. We
also characterize p-entailment of E3|H3 from the family {E1|H1, E2|H2} by
the property that E3|H3 = 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty
S ⊆ {E1|H1, E2|H2}. In Section 4 we suitably generalize the notion of iter-
ated conditioning; then, we examine some inference rules of System P and other
well known inference rules. The generalization of the notion of iterated con-
ditioning is necessary in order to examine the OR rule. In Section 5 we give
two results which relate p-entailment and iterated conditioning. The first result
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shows that the iterated conditional having as antecedent and consequent the
conjunction and the quasi conjunction of two conditional events, respectively, is
equal to 1. The second result characterizes the p-entailment of the conditional
event E3|H3 from a p-consistent family {E1|H1, E2|H2} by the property that
the iterated conditional (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) is equal to 1. Finally, we
examine two examples where the p-entailment of the conditional event E3|H3
from a p-consistent family {E1|H1, E2|H2} does not hold. We also show that in
these cases that (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) does not coincide with 1.
2 Preliminaries
In our approach events represent uncertain facts described by (non ambiguous)
logical propositions. An event A is a two-valued logical entity which is either
true (T ), or false (F ). The indicator of an event A is a two-valued numerical
quantity which is 1, or 0, according to whether A is true, or false, respectively.
We use the same symbol to refer to an event and its indicator. We denote by
Ω the sure event and by ∅ the impossible one (notice that, when necessary, the
symbol ∅ will denote the empty set). Given two events A and B, we denote by
A∧B, or simply by AB, the intersection, or conjunction, of A and B, as defined
in propositional logic; likewise, we denote by A ∨ B the union, or disjunction,
of A and B. We denote by A the negation of A. Of course, the truth values
for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are defined as usual. Given any
events A and B, we simply write A ⊆ B to denote that A logically implies
B, that is AB = ∅, which means that it is necessary that A and B cannot
both be true. Given two events A,H , with H 6= ∅, the conditional event A|H is
defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true (T), or false (F), or void
(V), according to whether AH is true, or AH is true, or H is true, respectively.
Given a conditional event A|H with P (A|H) = x, then for (the indicator of)
A|H we have A|H = AH + xH ∈ {1, 0, x} (Sanfilippo et al., 2018, Appendix
A.3). We recall below the notion of logical implication of Goodman and Nguyen
(1988) for conditional events (see also Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d).
Definition 1. Given two conditional events A|H and B|K we define that A|H
logically implies B|K (denoted by A|H ⊆ B|K) if and only if AH is true implies
BK is true and BK is true implies AH is true; i.e., AH ⊆ BK and BK ⊆ AH.
A generalization of the Goodman and Nguyen logical implication to conditional
random quantities has been given by (Pelessoni & Vicig, 2014).
The notions of p-consistency and p-entailment of Adams (1975) were formulated
for conditional events in the setting of coherence by Gilio and Sanfilippo (2010)
(see also Gilio, 2012; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2011, 2013c).
Definition 2. Let Fn = {Ei|Hi , i = 1, . . . , n} be a family of n condi-
tional events. Then, Fn is p-consistent if and only if the probability assessment
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = (1, 1, . . . , 1) on Fn is coherent.
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Definition 3. A p-consistent family Fn = {Ei|Hi , i = 1, . . . , n} p-entails a
conditional event E|H (denoted by Fn |=p E|H) if and only if for any coherent
probability assessment (p1, . . . , pn, z) on Fn ∪ {E|H} it holds that: if p1 = · · · =
pn = 1, then z = 1.
Of course, when Fn p-entails E|H , there may be coherent assessments
(p1, . . . , pn, z) with z 6= 1, but in such cases pi 6= 1 for at least one index i.
We say that the inference from a p-consistent family Fn to E|H is p-valid if and
only if Fn p-entails E|H . We recall the well known notion of quasi conjunction
among conditional events:
Definition 4. Given a family Fn = {Ei|Hi , i = 1, . . . , n} of n conditional
events, the quasi conjunction of the conditional events in Fn is defined as
QC(Fn) =
n∧
i=1
(Hi ∨ EiHi)|(
n∨
i=1
Hi).
Moreover, we recall the following characterization of p-entailment
(Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013c):
Theorem 1. Let a p-consistent family Fn = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} and a condi-
tional event E|H be given. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. Fn p-entails E|H ;
2. The assessment P = (1, . . . , 1, z) on F = Fn ∪ {E|H}, where P (Ei|Hi) = 1,
i = 1, . . . , n, P (E|H) = z, is coherent if and only if z = 1;
3. The assessment P = (1, . . . , 1, 0) on F = Fn ∪ {E|H}, where P (Ei|Hi) = 1,
i = 1, . . . , n, P (E|H) = 0, is not coherent;
4. Either there exists a nonempty S ⊆ Fn such that QC(S) implies E|H , or
H ⊆ E;
5. There exists a nonempty S ⊆ Fn such that QC(S) p-entails E|H .
We also recall the characterization of the p-entailment for two conditional events
(Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d, Theorem 7):
Theorem 2. Given two conditional events A|H, B|K, with AH 6= ∅. It holds
that
A|H ⇒p B|K ⇐⇒ A|H ⊆ B|K, or K ⊆ B ⇐⇒ Π ⊆ {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]
2 : x ≤ y},
where Π is the set of coherent assessments (x, y) on {A|H,B|K}.
We denote by X a random quantity, that is an uncertain real quantity, which
has a well determined but unknown value. We assume that X has a finite set
of possible values. Given any event H 6= ∅, agreeing to the betting metaphor,
if you assess that the prevision of “X conditional on H” (or short: “X given
H”), P(X |H), is equal to µ, this means that for any given real number s you are
willing to pay an amount µs and to receive sX , or µs, according to whether H is
true, or false (i.e., when the bet is called off), respectively. In particular, when X
is (the indicator of) an event A, then P(X |H) = P (A|H). In Gilio and Sanfilippo
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(2014) the notions of conjoined, disjoined, and iterated conditionals have been
studied in the framework of conditional random quantities. In particular, the
next result establishes some conditions under which two conditional random
quantities X |H and Y |K coincide (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014, Theorem 4):
Theorem 3. Given any events H 6= ∅ and K 6= ∅, and any random quantities
X and Y , let Π be the set of the coherent prevision assessments P(X |H) = µ
and P(Y |K) = ν.
(i) Assume that, for every (µ, ν) ∈ Π , the values ofX |H and Y |K always coincide
when H ∨K is true; then µ = ν for every (µ, ν) ∈ Π .
(ii) For every (µ, ν) ∈ Π , the values of X |H and Y |K always coincide when
H ∨K is true if and only if X |H = Y |K.
3 Generalized System P and Compound Conditionals
In this section we recall the notions of conjunction and iterated condition-
ing. Then, we show that A|H p-entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) =
1. Moreover, we show that {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3 if and only if
(E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1.
3.1 Exploring conjunction and iterated conditioning
We recall below the definition of conjuntion of two conditional events A|H and
B|K (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013b, 2013a, 2014). Different approaches to com-
pounded conditionals, not based on coherence, have been developed by other
authors (see, e.g., Kaufmann, 2009; McGee, 1989).
Definition 5. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with
P (A|H) = x and P (B|K) = y, we define their conjunction as the conditional
random quantity (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = Z | (H ∨K), where Z = min {A|H,B|K}.
In betting terms, z = P[(A|H)∧ (B|K)] represents the amount you agree to pay,
with the proviso that you will receive the quantity:
(A|H) ∧ (B|K) =


1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AH ∨BK is true,
x, if HBK is true,
y, if AHK is true,
z, if HK is true.
(1)
From (1), it follows that the conjunction (A|H)∧ (B|K) is the following random
quantity
(A|H) ∧ (B|K) = 1 · AHBK + x ·HBK + y ·AHK + z ·HK . (2)
We observe that if H = K, then HBK = AHK = ∅, so that (A|H) ∧ (B|K) =
ABH + zH; moreover, AB|H = ABH + pH, where p = P (AB|H). We notice
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that (A|H) ∧ (B|H) and AB|H coincide when H is true; then, by Theorem 3,
z = p; thus,
(A|H) ∧ (B|H) = AB|H. (3)
We recall that, given any coherent assessment (x, y) on {A|H,B|K}, with
A,H,B,K logically independent, and with H 6= ∅,K 6= ∅, the extension
z = P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] is coherent if and only if the following Fre´chet-Hoeffding
bounds are satisfied (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014, Theorem 7):
max{x+ y − 1, 0} = z′ ≤ z ≤ z′′ = min{x, y} . (4)
Note that the bounds in (4) coincide with the bounds for the conjunction of
unconditional probabilities (i.e., if P (A) = x and P (B) = y, then max{x+ y −
1, 0} ≤ P (AB) ≤ min{x, y}).
We now turn to recalling and discussing the notion of iterated conditioning
(see, e.g., (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a, 2013b, 2014)).
Definition 6 (Iterated conditioning). Given any pair of conditional events
A|H and B|K, with AH 6= ∅, the iterated conditional (B|K)|(A|H) is defined as
the conditional random quantity
(B|K)|(A|H) = (B|K) ∧ (A|H) + µA|H, (5)
where µ = P[(B|K)|(A|H)].
Remark 1. Notice that we assumed that AH 6= ∅ to give a nontrivial meaning
to the notion of the iterated conditional. Indeed, if AH were equal to ∅, that
is A|H = 0, then it would be the case that A|H = 1 and (B|K)|(A|H) =
(B|K)|0 = (B|K)∧(A|H)+µA|H = µ would follow; that is, (B|K)|(A|H) would
coincide with the (indeterminate) value µ. Similarly in the case of B|∅ (which is
of no interest): the trivial iterated conditional (B|K)|0 is not considered in our
approach.
We observe that, by linearity of prevision, it holds that
µ = P((B|K)|(A|H)) = P((B|K) ∧ (A|H)) + µP (A|H) = z + µ(1− x) ,
from which it follows that z = µx. Here, when x > 0, we obtain µ = z
x
∈ [0, 1].
Notice that z + µ(1 − x), i.e. µ, is the value of (B|K)|(A|H) when HK is true.
Then, by observing that
AHK ∨AHBK ∨ AHBK ∨HK = AH ∨HK ,
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we obtain
(B|K)|(A|H) =


1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHBK is true,
y, if AHK is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if HBK is true,
µ(1− x), if HBK is true,
µ, if AHK is true,
µ, if AHBK is true,
µ, if AHBK is true,
µ, if HK is true.
=


1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHBK is true,
y, if AHK is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if HBK is true,
µ(1− x), if HBK is true,
µ, if AH ∨HK is true.
In particular, when x = 0, it holds that
(B|K)|(A|H) =


1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHBK is true,
y, if AHK is true,
µ, if HBK is true,
µ, if HBK is true,
µ, if AH ∨HK is true.
=


1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHBK is true,
y, if AHK is true,
µ, if AH ∨H is true.
As we can see, in order that the prevision assessment µ on (B|K)|(A|H) be
coherent, µ must belong to the convex hull of the values 0, y, 1; that is, (also
when x = 0) it must be that µ ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1. Given two conditional events A|H and B|K, it holds that
A|H ⊆ B|K =⇒ (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = A|H . (6)
Proof. We set P (A|H) = x, P (B|K) = y, and P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] = z. As
A|H ⊆ B|K, it holds that AHBK = AHK = HBK = ∅ and AHBK = AH
(Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d, Remark 3). Then,
(A|H) ∧ (B|K) = AHBK + xHBK + yKAH + zHK = AH + xHBK + zHK.
Moreover,
A|H = AH + xH = AH + xHBK + xHK.
We notice that (A|H) ∧ (B|K) and A|H coincide when H ∨ K is true. Then,
z = x follows from Theorem 3. Therefore, (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = A|H . ⊓⊔
The following theorem shows that a conditional A|H p-entails another con-
ditional B|K if and only if the unique coherent prevision assessment for the
corresponding iterated conditonal (B|K)|(A|H) is equal to one.
Theorem 4. Given two (p-consistent) conditional events A|H and B|K, it
holds that,
A|H ⇒p B|K ⇐⇒ (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. (7)
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Proof. (⇒). We distinguish two cases: (i) A|H ⊆ B|K; (ii) K ⊆ B. Case (i). We
remark that if A|H ⊆ B|K, then A|H ≤ B|K and P (A|H) ≤ P (B|K); moreover,
(A|H) ∧ (B|K) = A|H . Then, by defining P((B|K)|(A|H)) = µ, P (A|H) = x,
we obtain
(B|K)|(A|H) = (A|H)∧(B|K)+µA|H = A|H+µA|H =


1, if AH is true,
µ, if AH is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if H is true.
By linearity of prevision, we obtain
P((B|K)|(A|H)) = µ = P (A|H) + µP (A|H) = x+ µ(1 − x) ; (8)
which implies that
(B|K)|(A|H) =
{
1, if AH is true,
µ, if AH ∨H is true.
In order for µ to be coherent, µ must belong to the convex hull of the set {1};
i.e. µ = 1. In other words, given two conditional events A|H and B|K, with
A|H ⊆ B|K, it holds that: P((B|K)|(A|H)) = 1. Thus (B|K)|(A|H) = 1.
Case (ii). If K ⊆ B it holds that P (B|K) = y = 1 and B|K = 1. Then,
(A|H)∧ (B|K) = (A|H)|(H ∨K) = A|H (see Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a, Remark
4). Moreover, (B|K)|(A|H) = A|H+µA|H and by linearity of prevision it holds
that µ = x+ µ(1− x). Then,
(B|K)|(A|H) =


1, if AH is true,
µ, if AH is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if H is true.
=
{
1, if AH is true,
µ, if AH ∨H is true.
Then, by coherence, µ = 1 and (B|K)|(A|H) = 1.
Thus, p-entailment of B|K from A|H implies (B|K)|(A|H) = 1.
(⇐). Assume that (B|K)|(A|H) = 1, so that the unique coherent assessment
for P[(B|K)|(A|H)] is µ = 1. Then, by observing that P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] ≤
P (B|K) = y, it follows that
P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] = P[(B|K)|(A|H)]P (A|H) = P (A|H) = x ≤ y.
Then, when x = 1, it holds that y = 1; that is, A|H p-entails B|K. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let three conditional events E1|H1, E2|H2, and E3|H3 be given,
where {E1|H1, E2|H2} is p-consistent. The quasi conjunction QC(E1|H1, E2|H2)
p-entails E3|H3 if and only if (E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1.
Proof. The assertion directly follows by applying Theorem 4, with A|H =
QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) and B|K = E3|H3. ⊓⊔
In the next result we characterize the p-entailment of E3|H3 from the family
{E1|H1, E2|H2} by the property that E3|H3 = 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for
some nonempty S ⊆ {E1|H1, E2|H2}.
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Theorem 5. Let three conditional events E1|H1, E2|H2, and E3|H3 be given,
where {E1|H1, E2|H2} is p-consistent. Then, the family {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-
entails E3|H3 if and only if at least one of the following conditions is satis-
fied: (i) E3|H3 = 1; (ii) (E3|H3)|(E1|H1) = 1; (iii) (E3|H3)|(E2|H2) = 1; (iv)
(E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1.
Proof. (⇒). By Theorem 1, as {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3, it follows that
QC(S) ⊆ E3|H3 for some ∅ 6= S ⊆ {E1|H1, E2|H2}, or H3 ⊆ E3. If H3 ⊆ E3,
then P (E3|H3) = 1 and E3|H3 = 1. If S = {Ei|Hi}, for i = 1 or i = 2, by
Theorem 4 it holds that (E3|H3)|(Ei|Hi) = 1. If S = {E1|H1, E2|H2}, then by
Corollary 1 it holds that (E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1.
(⇐). If E3|H3 = 1 then the unique coherent assessment on E3|H3 is P (E3|H3) =
1. This means that H3 ⊆ E3 and then {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3.
If (E3|H3)|(Ei|Hi) = 1, for i = 1 or i = 2, then by Theorem 4 it holds that Ei|Hi
p-entails E3|H3 and hence, by Theorem 4, {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3.
Finally, if (E3|H3)|QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) = 1, then by Corollary 1 it holds that
QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) p-entails E3|H3 and hence, by Theorem 4, {E1|H1, E2|H2}
p-entails E3|H3. ⊓⊔
4 Iterated conditionals and some inference rules
In this section we examine some inference rules with {E1|H1, E2|H2} as the
premise set, and E3|H3 as the conclusion, by showing that, if {E1|H1, E2|H2} ⇒p
E3|H3, then (E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)) = 1. The notion of conjunction of three
conditional events is given below (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017a).
Definition 7. Given a family of three conditional events F = {E1|H1,
E2|H2,E3|H3}, we set P (Ei|Hi) = xi, i = 1, 2, 3, P[(Ei|Hi) ∧ (Ej |Hj)] = xij =
xji, i 6= j. The conjunction C(F) = (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3) is defined as
the conditional random quantity
C(F) = (E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)∧(E3|H3) =


1, if E1H1E2H2E3H3 is true
0, if E1H1 ∨ E2H2 ∨ E3H3 is true,
x1, if H1E2H2E3H3 is true,
x2, if H2E1H1E3H3 is true,
x3, if H3E1H1E2H2 is true,
x12, if H1H2E3H3 is true,
x13, if H1H3E2H2 is true,
x23, if H2H3E1H1 is true,
x123, if H1H2H3 is true
(9)
where x123 = P[C(F)].
We recall below the definition of the object (E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)), which
is under study in (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017b).
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Definition 8. Let be given three conditional events E1|H1, E2|H2, and E3|H3,
with (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) 6= 0. We denote by (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) the
conditional random quantity
(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3) + µ(1− (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) ,
where µ = P[(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2))].
Remark 2. We observe that, defining P[(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)] = t and
P[(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)] = z, by the linearity of prevision it holds that µ = t +
µ(1− z); then, t = µz, that is
P[(E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)∧(E3|H3)] = P[(E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2))]P[(E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)].
Modus Ponens: {C|A,A} ⇒p C. It holds that (C|A) ∧ A = AC = QC(AC);
then, by Theorem 4, as AC ⊆ C it follows that
C|((C|A) ∧A) = C|(QC((C|A), A) = C|AC = 1 .
This can be seen as an analogy to the fact that the modus ponens is logically
valid in logic and that the probabilistic modus ponens is p-valid.
Modus Tollens: {C|A,C} ⇒p A. It holds that (C|A) ∧ C = xAC, where x =
P (C|A), while QC(C|A,C) = AC; then, assuming x > 0, we obtain
A|((C|A)∧C) = A∧(C|A)∧C+µ(1−(C|A)∧C)) =
{
µ, if A ∨ C is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if AC is true.
By coherence it must be the case that µ = x + µ(1 − x), i.e., x = µx, which
implies µ = x+ µ(1 − x) = 1; therefore,
A|((C|A) ∧ C) = 1 .
This can be seen as an analogy to the fact that the modus tollens is logically
valid in logic and that the probabilistic modus tollens is p-valid. Notice that, if
x = 0, then ((C|A) ∧C) = 0 and the object A|((C|A) ∧ C) = A|0 = µ, which is
indeterminate (see Remark 1).
Bayes. We note that (E|AH) ∧ (H |A) = EH |A = QC(E|AH,H |A); then,
as EH |A ⊆ H |EA, by Theorem (2) it holds that {E|AH,H |A} ⇒p H |EA.
Moreover, by Theorem 4, it follows that
(H |EA)|((E|HA)∧H |A) = (H |EA)|(QC((E|HA), H |A) = (H |EA)|(EH |A) = 1 .
In particular, if A = Ω, we obtain (H |E)|(EH) = 1.
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4.1 And, Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity of System P
In this section we consider the following inference rules of System P
(Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990): And, Cut, and Cautious Monotonic-
ity (short: CM). System P is a basic nonmonotonic reasoning which al-
lows for retracting conclusions in the light of new premises. The prob-
abilistic versions of the rules of System P are p-valid (Adams, 1975;
Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz, & Sanfilippo, 2002; Gilio, 2002). Experimental ev-
idence supports the psychological plausibility of System P (see, e.g.
Da Silva Neves, Bonnefon, & Raufaste, 2002; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2003, 2005;
Schurz, 2005).
And rule: {B|A,C|A} ⇒p BC|A. By formula (3), it holds that (B|A)∧ (C|A) =
BC|A = QC(B|A,C|A); then, by Theorem 4, as BC|A ⊆ BC|A it follows that
(BC|A)|((C|A) ∧ (B|A)) = (BC|A)|QC(B|A,C|A) = (BC|A)|(BC|A) = 1 .
Cut rule: {C|AB,B|A} ⇒p C|A. We note that (C|AB) ∧ (B|A) = BC|A =
QC(C|AB,B|A); then, by Theorem 4, as BC|A ⊆ C|A it follows that
(C|A)|((C|AB) ∧ (B|A)) = (C|A)|QC(C|AB,B|A) = (C|A)|(BC|A) = 1 .
CM rule: {C|A,B|A} ⇒p C|AB. By formula (3), it holds that (C|A)∧ (B|A) =
BC|A = QC(C|A,B|A); then, by Theorem 4, as BC|A ⊆ C|AB it follows that
(C|AB)|((C|A) ∧ (B|A)) = (C|AB)|QC(C|A,B|A) = (C|AB)|(BC|A) = 1 .
4.2 Or rule of System P
We recall that the Or rule is p-valid, that is {C|A,C|B} ⇒p C|(A∨B). The next
result shows that the conclusion of the Or rule, C|(A∨B), given the conjunction
of the premises, (C|A) ∧ (C|B), coincides with 1.
Theorem 6. Given a p-consistent family {C|A,C|B} it holds that
(C|(A ∨B)|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Proof. By Definition 8, we obtain
(C|(A∨B))|((C|A)∧(C|B)) = (C|(A∨B))∧(C|A)∧(C|B)+µ[1−(C|A)∧(C|B)] ,
where µ = P[(C|(A∨B))|(C|A)∧ (C|B)]. We set P (C|A) = x, P (C|B) = y, and
P((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = z; then,
(C|A) ∧ (C|B) =


1, if ABC is true,
0, if (A ∨B)C is true,
x, if ABC is true,
y, if ABC is true,
z, if AB is true.
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Moreover, by defining P[(C|(A ∨B)) ∧ (C|A) ∧ (C|B)] = t, we obtain
(C|(A ∨B)) ∧ (C|A) ∧ (C|B) =


1, if ABC is true,
0, if (A ∨B)C is true,
x, if ABC is true,
y, if ABC is true,
t, if AB is true.
As we can see, (C|(A ∨ B)) ∧ (C|A) ∧ (C|B) and (C|A) ∧ (C|B) coincide when
A ∨B is true; then, by Theorem 3 it holds that t = z, so that
(C|(A ∨B)) ∧ (C|A) ∧ (C|B) = (C|A) ∧ (C|B).
Then,
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = (C|A) ∧ (C|B) + µ[1− (C|A) ∧ (C|B)] , (10)
and by the linearity of prevision we obtain µ = z + µ(1 − z), so that z = µz.
Moreover, by (10) we obtain
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =


1, if ABC is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if ABC is true,
y + µ(1− y), if ABC is true,
µ, if ABC is true,
µ, if ABC is true,
µ, if ABC is true,
µ, if AB is true,
which reduces to
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =


1, if ABC is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if ABC is true,
y + µ(1− y), if ABC is true,
µ, if ABC ∨C is true.
In order to prove that (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1, we distinguish the
following cases: (a) z > 0; (b) z = x = y = 0; (c) z = 0, x > 0, y > 0; (d)
z = y = 0, x > 0; (e) z = x = 0, y > 0.
Case (a). By recalling that z = µz, as z > 0 it follows that µ = 1; then,
y + µ(1− y) = x+ µ(1− x) = 1, so that
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =
{
1, if ABC ∨ABC ∨ABC is true,
µ, if ABC ∨C is true.
Then, by coherence, µ = 1 and (C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Case (b). As x = y = 0, it holds that x+ µ(1− x) = y + µ(1− y) = µ; then
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =
{
1, if ABC is true,
µ, if ABC is true.
,
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and, by coherence, µ = 1; thus, (C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Case (c). By coherence, µ is a linear convex combination of the values 1, y +
µ(1− y), and x+ µ(1 − x), that is,
µ = λ1 + λ2(y + µ(1 − y)) + λ3(x+ µ(1 − x)) , (11)
with λh ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ1 +λ2 +λ3 = 1. The equation (11) can be written
as
µ(λ1 + λ2y + λ3x) = λ1 + λ2y + λ3x ,
where λ1 + λ2y + λ3x > 0; then µ = y + µ(1 − y) = x + µ(1 − x) = 1 and
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Case (d). As y = 0 it holds that y + µ(1− y) = µ; then,
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =


1, if ABC is true,
x+ µ(1− x), if ABC is true,
µ, if BC is true.
By coherence, µ is a linear convex combination of the values 1, x+µ(1−x), that
is
µ = λ1 + λ2(x + µ(1− x)) , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 , λ1 + λ2 = 1 . (12)
The equation (12) can be written as µ(λ1+λ2x) = λ1+λ2x, where λ1+λ2x > 0;
then, µ = x+ µ(1− x) = 1 and (C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Case (e). Since x = 0, it holds that x+ µ(1 − x) = µ; then,
(C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) =


1, if ABC is true,
y + µ(1− y), if ABC is true,
µ, if AC is true.
By coherence, µ is a linear convex combination of the values 1, y+µ(1− y), that
is
µ = λ1 + λ2(y + µ(1− y)) , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 , λ1 + λ2 = 1 . (13)
The equation (13) can be written as µ(λ1+λ2y) = λ1+λ2y, where λ1+λ2y > 0;
then, µ = y + µ(1− y) = 1 and (C|(A ∨B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1. ⊓⊔
Remark 3. We observe that
QC(C|A,C|B) = ((A ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ C))|(A ∨B) = C|(A ∨B).
Then, the statement of Theorem 6 amounts to say that the iterated conditional
QC(C|A,C|B)|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) is equal to 1. This aspect will be analyzed in
general in the next section.
5 Iterated conditionals and p-entailment
In this section we give two results which relate p-entailment and iterated con-
ditioning. In the next result, by defining F = {E1|H1, E2|H2}, QC(F) =
QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) and C(F) = (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2), we show that, under p-
consistency of F , the iterated conditional QC(F)|(C(F)) is equal to 1.
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Theorem 7. Let a p-consistent family F = {E1|H1, E2|H2} be given. Then,
QC(F)|(C(F)) = 1.
Proof. We set
P (E1|H1) = x1 , P (E2|H2) = x2 , P(C(F)) = x12 , P[C(F) ∧QC(F)] = η .
Moreover, we set P[QC(F)|C(F)] = µ. Then,
QC(F)|C(F) = C(F) ∧QC(F) + µ(1 − C(F)) .
It can be verified that the possible values of the random vector (C(F), C(F) ∧
QC(F)) are
(1, 1) , (0, 0) , (x1, x1) , (x2, x2) , (x12, η) .
The value (x12, η) is associated to the constituent H1H2. As we can see, con-
ditionally on H1 ∨ H2 being true, C(F) and C(F) ∧ QC(F) coincide; then, by
Theorem 3, x12 = η, so that QC(F) = C(F). Then,
QC(F)|C(F) = C(F) + µ(1 − C(F)) =


1, if C(F) = 1,
µ, if C(F) = 0,
x1 + µ(1 − x1), if C(F) = x1,
x2 + µ(1 − x2), if C(F) = x2,
x12 + µ(1 − x12), if C(F) = x12.
By the linearity of prevision, we obtain µ = x12+µ(1−x12), that is x12 = µx12.
Then,
QC(F)|C(F) = C(F)+µ(1−C(F)) =


1, if C(F) = 1,
x1 + µ(1− x1), if C(F) = x1,
x2 + µ(1− x2), if C(F) = x2,
µ, if C(F) = 0, or C(F) = x12.
We distinguish the following cases:
(a) x1 = x2 = 0; (b) x1 > 0, x2 > 0; (c) x1 = 0, x2 > 0; (d) x2 = 0, x1 > 0.
Case (a). Since x1 = x2 = 0, it holds that x1+µ(1−x1) = x2+µ(1−x2) = µ, so
that QC(F)|C(F) ∈ {1, µ}. Based on the betting scheme, µ = P[QC(F)|C(F)]
is the amount to be paid in order to receive 1, or µ, according to whether the
event (C(F) = 1) is true, or false, respectively. Then, by coherence, it must be
the case that µ = 1. Therefore, QC(F)|C(F) = 1.
Case (b). By coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1,
x1 + µ(1− x1), and x2 + µ(1− x2), that is,
µ = λ1 + λ2(x1 + µ(1− x1)) + λ3(x2 + µ(1 − x2)) , (14)
with λh ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ1 +λ2 +λ3 = 1. The equation (14) can be written
as
µ(λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2) = λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2 ,
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where λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2 > 0; then, µ = x1 + µ(1− x1) = x2 + µ(1− x2) = 1 and
QC(F)|C(F) = 1.
Case (c). As x1 = 0, it holds that x1 + µ(1− x1) = µ, so that
QC(F)|C(F) ∈ {1, x2 + µ(1− x2), µ} .
Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1, x2+
µ(1− x2), that is
µ = λ1 + λ2[x2 + µ(1− x2)] , λ1 + λ2 = 1 , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 .
It follows that µ(λ1 + λ2x2) = λ1 + λ2x2, with λ1 + λ2x2 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
QC(F)|C(F) = 1.
Case (d). As x2 = 0, it holds that x2 + µ(1 − x2) = µ, so that QC(F)|C(F) ∈
{1, x1+µ(1−x1), µ}. Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination
of the values 1, x1 + µ(1 − x1), that is
µ = λ1 + λ2[12 + µ(1− x1)] , λ1 + λ2 = 1 , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 .
It follows that µ(λ1 + λ2x1) = λ1 + λ2x1, with λ1 + λ2x1 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
QC(F)|C(F) = 1.
Therefore, from the p-consistency of the family F it follows that QC(F)|C(F) =
1. ⊓⊔
The next theorem shows that the p-entailment of a conditional event E3|H3
from a p-consistent family {E1|H1, E2|H2} is equivalent to the iterated condi-
tional (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) being equal to 1.
Theorem 8. Let three conditional events E1|H1, E2|H2, and E3|H3 be given,
where {E1|H1, E2|H2} is p-consistent. Then, {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3 if
and only if (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1.
Proof. (⇒). We observe that by p-consistency E1H1E2H2 6= ∅ and then
(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) 6= 0. By Theorem 1, {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3 if and
only if it holds that QC(S) ⊆ E3|H3 for some ∅ 6= S ⊆ {E1|H1, E2|H2}, or
H3 ⊆ E3. We observe that, when H3 * E3, it holds that S = {E1|H1}, or
S = {E2|H2}, or S = {E1|H1, E2|H2}. We show that the iterated conditional
may be represented as
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)) = (E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2) + µ(1− (E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)) ,
(15)
where µ = P[(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2))].
We distinguish the following four cases:
(i) H3 ⊆ E3;
(ii) H3 * E3 and E1|H1 ⊆ E3|H3;
(iii) H3 * E3 and E2|H2 ⊆ E3|H3;
(iv) H3 * E3 and QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) ⊆ E3|H3.
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Case (i). If H3 ⊆ E3, then E3|H3 = P (E3|H3) = 1. We set P (Ei|Hi) =
xi, P[(Ei|Hi) ∧ (Ej |Hj)] = xij and we recall that
max{xi + xj − 1, 0} ≤ xij ≤ min{xi, xj} .
Then, as x3 = 1, we obtain x13 = x1, x23 = x2; it follows that for the random
vector ((E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2), (E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)∧ (E3|H3)) the possible values are
(1, 1) , (0, 0) , (x1, x1) , (x2, x2) , (x12, x12) , (x12, x123) ,
where x123 = P[(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)] = µ. As we can see, conditionally
on H1∨H2∨H3 being true, (E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2) and (E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)∧ (E3|H3)
coincide; then, by coherence, x12 = x123, so that (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)
and (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) coincide. Then, (15) is satisfied.
Case (ii). As E1|H1 ⊆ E3|H3, by Proposition 1 it holds that E1|H1 ∧ E3|H3 =
E1|H1 and (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3) = (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2). Then, (15) is
satisfied.
Case (iii). As E2|H2 ⊆ E3|H3, by Proposition 1 it holds that E2|H2 ∧ E3|H3 =
E2|H2 and (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3) = (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2). Then, (15) is
satisfied.
Case (iv). By taking into account that QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) ⊆ E3|H3, the set of
possible values of the random vector
((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) , QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) , (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)),
as shown in Table 1, is
{(1, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 0) , (x1, 1, x1) , (x2, 1, x2) , (x12, ν12, x12) , (x12, ν12, x123)},
where x1 = P (E1|H1), x2 = P (E2|H2), x12 = P [(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)],
ν12 = P[QC(E1|H1, E2|H2)], x123 = P [(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)]. As
we can see, conditionally on H1 ∨ H2 ∨ H3 being true (i.e., H1H2H3
being false), (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) and (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)
coincide; then, by Theorem 3 it holds that x12 = x123, so that
(E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3) = (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2). Then, (15) is satis-
fied.
Now, by using the representation (15), for the iterated conditional we obtain
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) =


1, if E1H1E2H2 is true,
µ, if E1H1 ∨E2H2 is true,
x1 + µ(1− x1), if H1E2H2 is true,
x2 + µ(1− x2), if E1H1H2 is true,
x12 + µ(1− x12), if H1H2 is true.
(16)
Moreover, by the linearity of prevision it holds that
µ = P[(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2))] = x12 + µ(1− x12) ;
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Ch (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) (E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2) ∧ (E3|H3)
E1H1E2H2E3H3 1 1 1
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2H3 0 0 0
E1H1H2E3H3 x2 1 x2
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1E2H2H3 0 0 0
E1H1H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1H2E3H3 0 0 0
E1H1H2H3 0 0 0
H1E2H2E3H3 x1 1 x1
H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
H1E2H2E3H3 0 0 0
H1E2H2H3 0 0 0
H1H2E3H3 x12 ν12 x12
H1H2H3 x12 ν12 x123
Table 1. Possible values of the random vector ((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2), QC(E1|H1, E2|H2),
(E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)∧(E3|H3)), under the assumption that QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) ⊆ E3|H3.
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from which it follows that x12 = µx12. Then, (16) becomes
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)) =


1, if E1H1E2H2 is true,
x1 + µ(1− x1), if H1E2H2 is true,
x2 + µ(1− x2), if E1H1H2 is true,
µ, if H1H2 ∨E1H1 ∨E2H2 is true.
(17)
In order to prove that (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1, as already done in
the proof of Theorem 6, we distinguish the following cases: (a) x12 > 0; (b)
x12 = x1 = x2 = 0; (c) x12 = x1 > 0, x2 > 0; (d) x12 = x2 = 0, x1 > 0; (e)
x12 = x1 = 0, x2 > 0.
Case (a). As x12 > 0 and x12 = µx12, it follows that µ = 1 and then x1 + µ(1−
x1) = x2 + µ(1− x2) = 1. Therefore, (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1.
Case (b). As x1 = x2 = 0, it holds that x1+µ(1−x1) = x2+µ(1−x2) = µ, so that
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)) ∈ {1, µ}. We observe that, based on the metaphor
of the betting scheme, µ = P[(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2))] is the amount to be
paid in order to receive 1, or µ, according to whether E1H1E2H2 is true, or false,
respectively. Then, by discarding the case where it is received back what has been
paid, coherence requires that µ = 1. Therefore (E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)) = 1.
Case (c). By coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1,
x1 + µ(1− x1), and x2 + µ(1− x2), that is,
µ = λ1 + λ2(x1 + µ(1− x1)) + λ3(x2 + µ(1 − x2)) , (18)
with λh ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ1 +λ2 +λ3 = 1. The equation (18) can be written
as
µ(λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2) = λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2 ,
where λ1 + λ2x1 + λ3x2 > 0; then, µ = x1 + µ(1− x1) = x2 + µ(1− x2) = 1 and
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1.
Case (d). As x2 = 0, it holds that x2 + µ(1− x2) = µ, so that
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) ∈ {1, x1 + µ(1− x1), µ} .
Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1, x1+
µ(1− x1), that is
µ = λ1 + λ2[12 + µ(1− x1)] , λ1 + λ2 = 1 , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 .
It follows that µ(λ1 + λ2x1) = λ1 + λ2x1, with λ1 + λ2x1 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1.
Case (e). As x1 = 0, it holds that x1 + µ(1− x1) = µ, so that
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) ∈ {1, x2 + µ(1− x2), µ} .
Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1, x2+
µ(1− x2), that is
µ = λ1 + λ2[x2 + µ(1− x2)] , λ1 + λ2 = 1 , λ1 ≥ 0 , λ2 ≥ 0 .
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It follows that µ(λ1 + λ2x2) = λ1 + λ2x2, with λ1 + λ2x2 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) = 1.
(⇐). Assume that (E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)) = 1, so that the unique coherent
prevision assessment on (E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) is µ = 1. From Remark 2
it holds that x123 = µx12 = x12. Moreover, x123 ≤ x3 (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017a,
Equation (8)) and x12 ≥ max{x1 + x2 − 1, 0} (see Equation (4)). Then, it holds
that
max{x1 + x2 − 1, 0} ≤ x12 = x123 ≤ x3 ,
and, when x1 = x2 = 1, it follows that x12 = x123 = x3 = 1. Therefore,
{E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails E3|H3. ⊓⊔
Remark 4. We recall that {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) (QAND
rule, see, e.g., Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2011, 2013c). Then, Theorem 7 follows by
applying Theorem 8 with E3|H3 = QC(E1|H1, E2|H2). Similar comments can
be made for the inference rules examined in Section 4.
In the examples below we show that if {E1|H1, E2|H2} does not p-entail E3|H3,
the iterated conditional (E3|H3)|((E1|H1)∧ (E2|H2)) does not coincide with 1.
Example 1 (Denial of the antecedent). We consider the rule where the premise
set is {A,C|A} and the conclusion is C. As is well known, that Denial of the
antecedent is neither logically valid in logic nor p-valid in probability logic.
Indeed, by defining P (A) = x, P (C|A) = y, P (C) = z, it holds that
P (C) = z = 1−P (C) = 1−[P (C|A)P (A)+P (C|A)P (A)] = 1−y(1−x)−P (C|A)x;
Then, when x = y = 1, we obtain z = 1 − P (C|A) ∈ [0, 1]; thus, {A,C|A} does
not p-entail C. Then, by Theorem 8, the iterated conditional C|(A∧(C|A)) does
not coincide with 1. Indeed, by defining P[C|(A ∧ (C|A))] = µ, it holds that
C|(A∧(C|A)) = C∧A∧(C|A)+µ(1−A∧(C|A)) =


µ, if AC is true,
µ, if AC is true,
µ(1− y), if AC is true,
y + µ(1− y), if AC is true.
If y = 1, we obtain
C|(A ∧ (C|A)) =


µ, if AC is true,
µ, if AC is true,
1, if AC is true,
0, if AC is true,
with µ being coherent, for every µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, C|(A ∧ (C|A)) 6= 1.
Example 2 (Affirmation of the consequent). We consider the rule where the
premise set is {C,C|A} and the conclusion is A. Affirmation of the consequent is
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neither logically valid in logic nor p-valid in probability logic. Indeed, by defining
P (C) = x, P (C|A) = y, P (A) = z, and P (C|A) = t, it holds that
P (C) = x = P (C|A)P (A) + P (C|A)P (A) = yz + t(1− z).
Then, when x = y = 1, we obtain 1 = z + t − zt, that is z(1 − t) = (1 − t).
Therefore, when t < 1, it follows that z = 1. In other words, by adding the
premise P (C|A) < 1 (i.e. what we introduced as a negated default in Gilio et al.,
2016), it holds that
P (C) = 1, P (C|A) = 1, P (C|A) < 1⇒ P (A) = 1.
But in general (where no assumptions are made about P (C|A)), z ∈ [0, 1];
thus p-entailment of A from {C,C|A} does not hold. Then, by Theorem 8, the
iterated conditional A|(C ∧ (C|A)) does not coincide with 1. Indeed, by defining
P[A|(C ∧ (C|A))] = µ, it holds that
A|(C ∧ (C|A)) = A∧C ∧ (C|A)+µ(1−C ∧ (C|A)) =


1, if AC is true,
µ(1− y), if AC is true,
µ, if C is true.
If y = 1, we obtain
A|(C ∧ (C|A)) =


1, if AC is true,
0, if AC is true,
µ, if C is true.
with µ being coherent, for every µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, A|(C ∧ (C|A)) 6= 1.
As another example, we could consider Transitivity, where {C|B,B|A} is the
premise set and C|A is the conclusion. The p-entailment does not hold, indeed
the assessment (1, 1, z) on {C|B,B|A,C|A} is coherent for any z ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
by Theorem 8, the iterated conditional (C|A)|(C|B) ∧ (B|A) does not coincide
with 1. But, by adding the negated default P (A|(A ∨ B)) < 1 it holds that
(Gilio et al., 2016, Theorem 5)
P (C|B) = 1, P (B|A) = 1, P (A|(A ∨B)) < 1 ⇒ P (C|A) = 1.
6 Concluding remarks
The results of this paper are based on the notions of conjoined conditionals
and iterated conditionals. These objects, introduced in recent papers by Gilio
and Sanfilippo, are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable
conditional random quantities with values in the interval [0, 1]. By exploiting
the logical implication of Goodman and Nguyen, we have shown that A|H p-
entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Moreover, we have shown that a
p-consistent family F = {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails a conditional event E3|H3 if
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and only if E3|H3 = 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty subset S of F .
We have also applied our result considered the inference rules And, Cut, Cau-
tious Monotonicity, and Or of System P and the inference rules Modus Ponens,
Modus Tollens, and Bayes. We have also shown that the iterated conditional
QC(F)|C(F) is equal to 1 for every p-consistent family F = {E1|H1, E2|H2}.
Then, we have characterized the p-entailment of E3|H3 from a p-consistent
family F by showing that it amounts to the condition (E3|H3)|C(F) = 1.
Finally, we examined two examples (Denial of the Antecedent and Affirma-
tion of the Consequent) when the p-entailment of the conditional event E3|H3
from a p-consistent family {E1|H1, E2|H2} does not hold by also showing that
(E3|H3)|((E1|H1) ∧ (E2|H2)) 6= 1. Concerning the Affirmation of the Conse-
quent, we also showed that (a kind of conditional) p-entailment holds if we add
a suitable negated default in the set of premises. Psychologically, this could serve
as a new explanation why some people interpret Affirmation of the Consequent
as a valid argument form. Indeed, this argument form plays an important roˆle in
abductive reasoning in philosophy of science (e.g., where conclusions about pos-
sible causes/diseases are derived from effects/symptoms). Future work is needed
to explore such applications of the presented theory and to explore further formal
desiderata also related to the deduction theorem.
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